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I. Introduction
Proponents of the establishment of small claims courts in the
early 1900's and modern theorists of the alternative dispute resolu-
tion movement have all believed that a society ought to have acces-
sible and effective mechanisms for asserting legal rights.1 Some
believe that social disorder can be avoided if people perceive the
availability of civil justice.2 Economists assume that wealth will be
maximized through social efficiency where there is honest and reli-
able enforcement of promises between buyers and sellers.3 Thus,
peace, wealth, and (presumably) happiness depend on, or will be
increased by, the existence of reliable and well used dispute han-
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1. See generally Roscoe Pound, Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26
HARV. L. REV. 302 (1913) (advocating heightened accessibility of courts to promote
social justice); Suzanne Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, Contemporary Studies Pro-
ject: The Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433, 434
(1990) (same).
2. See generally DAVID CAPLOVrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE 15:1, 15:4(a)(1)
(1963).
3. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 21 (1992) ("Contract law spells out when and how the legal system will intervene
in the contracting process to reduce bargaining costs and to promote the efficient
allocation of resources"); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1979) ("The fundamental economic principle with
which we begin is that if voluntary exchanges are permitted - if, in other words, a
market is allowed to operate - resources will gravitate toward their most valuable
uses.").
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dling institutions. Stated in less inflated terms, a small claims court
that functions well might serve three purposes: (1) fair resolution
of civil disputes; (2) deterrence of violent self-help by disputants;
and (3) identification of recurring social problems that might be
proper subjects for legislative or administrative action.
Governments across the country have responded explicitly and
implicitly to these ideas by establishing small claims courts as an
addition to the stock of dispute resolution modes.4 These courts
are usually described as especially valuable because they do not
require a grievant either to have or to obtain legal expertise. 5
This Article presents empirical data on the operation of the
small claims court in the city of Denver.6 The study underlying this
Article evaluated the court in terms of (1) users' reactions, (2) the
correctness of outcomes (recognizing that a determination of the
underlying truth may be impossible), (3) the correctness of proce-
dures (allowing for the informality that has been characterized as
essential for their operation), and (4) the effective power of the
court in terms of enforcement of results.
The study shows that small claims courts may be paradigmatic of
governmental responses to social problems. They do some good
work and some bad work; people's impressions of the work they do
may be significantly skewed; no one knows how helpful their exist-
ence is to the entire group of people whose welfare they are in-
tended to improve; and it is hard to determine whether the
individuals they actually do serve are better off for having been
able to use their processes.
This study answers two fundamental questions about small
claims courts: (1) Who usually wins? (2) Do victors collect their
judgments? The rate of victory for plaintiffs who file claims and
appear in court is eighty-five percent. Of winning plaintiffs, fifty-
five percent never collect any part of their judgments. Overall,
among victorious plaintiffs, the judgment amounts collected equal
thirty-one percent of the total amounts awarded. Thus, as has been
the pattern in other small claims courts studied,7 the operation of
4. JOHN C. RUHNKA & STEVEN WELLER, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAL
EXAMINATION 201-13, app. A (1978).
5. See ARTHUR BEST, WHEN CONSUMERS COMPLAIN ch. 10 (1981) (history and
typical performance of small claims courts for treatment of consumer disputes); Bar-
bara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of
the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & Soc. REV. 219 (1975).
6. There is only one small claims court in the city of Denver.
7. See, e.g., Archibald S. Alexander, Small Claims Courts in Montana: A Statisti-
cal Study, 44 MONT. L. REV. 227 (1983); William G. Haemmel, The North Carolina
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the court must be viewed in the context of overwhelming advan-
tage to plaintiffs at the trial stage and of significant disadvantage to
plaintiffs after trial. A system where plaintiffs almost always win
may be subject to a critique of pro-plaintiff bias, or its record may
only reflect that due to the difficulty of pursuing legal relief, most
of the plaintiffs who sue actually present legitimate claims. With
regard to judgment collection, two issues are clear. If the chance of
collecting money awards is very small, the operation of the court
may not be a sensible allocation of societal resources. Also, given
the small prospect of judgment collection, it is likely that plaintiffs
are not adequately aware of the likelihood that in-court victory will
not lead to satisfaction of a judgment.
The small claims court presents a central irony: winning is easy
but collecting is difficult. Some might suggest we abolish small
claims courts entirely. This Article proposes instead that we direct
more funds to small claims courts or reorganize them so that they
might operate more effectively. The continuing existence of small
claims courts nationally through several generations of experience
suggests that they have wide support and accomplish a variety of
functions. Many people who use them as plaintiffs would probably
support their continued existence. Perhaps the threat of legal ac-
tion through small claims courts helps some individuals resolve dis-
putes that would otherwise not be resolved. And certainly, the
idea that a "people's court" should exist is popular among
legislators.8
This Article explores these issues, and some empirical data re-
lated to them. Part II explains Colorado's small claims court his-
tory and legislative background. Part III discusses the court's
current operation. Part IV develops a critique of the court's cur-
rent status. This Article concludes by proposing legislative action
to improve the efficacy and usefulness of the Colorado small claims
court.
Small Claims Court - An Empirical Study, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503 (1973); Carl
R. Pagter et. al, Comment, The California Small Claims Court, 52 CAL. L. REv. 876
(1964); Robert J. Hollingsworth et. al, Note, The Ohio Small Claims Court: An Em-
pirical Study, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 469 (1973).
8. See Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 5; RUHNKA & WELLER, supra note
4, at 201-13.
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II. Colorado Small Claims Court History and Legislative
Enactments
The Colorado small claims court was established in 1976, with
the legislative intention of providing inexpensive, simple, and
speedy justice to the average person.9 The county court system ex-
isting prior to 1976 was intended to be simplified, 10 but apparently
failed to benefit disputants having small claims." A New York
Times survey conducted in the early 1970's used Denver's county
court as an example of a system ineffective for individual plain-
tiffs.' 2 The survey stated that 70% of the cases filed in Denver's
county court system were filed by collection agencies, and 25%
were filed by landlords.'3 That meant that only 5% of the 50,000
annual cases were filed by individuals.' 4 The Colorado legislature
hoped to create a forum for people who did not usually use the
court system and to provide a means for resolving minor day-to-
day problems.' 5
At the time Colorado created its small claims courts, many other
states had already done so, and a great deal of scholarly study had
been directed toward such courts.16 This background contributed
to the Colorado approach, although the state's statute was an origi-
nal work and not an adaptation of another state's law.'7
In the United States, small claims courts originated in the early
1900's as a response to the inadequacies of the existing judicial
structure. 18 The civil court procedures at that time were becoming
too complex for wage earners and business people with small
9. 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 517 (current version at CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-6-401 to
13-6-416 (1987 & Supp. 1993)).
10. Committee Hearings on S.B. 52 Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Feb.
9, 1976) (audio tapes on file at the Colorado State Archives) [hereinafter 1976
Hearings].
11. Id.
12. Id. (statement of Barry Goldstein, Colorado Bar Association).
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10.
16. See William G. Haemmel, The North Carolina Small Claims Court - An Em-
pirical Study, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503 (1973); Michael H. Minton & Jon E. Stef-
fenson, Small Claims Courts: A Survey and Analysis, 55 JUDICATURE 324 (1972); John
M. Steadman & Richard S. Rosenstein, "Small Claims" Consumer Plaintiffs in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court: An Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1973);
Carl R. Pagter et al., Comment, The California Small Claims Court, 52 CAL. L. REV.
876 (1964); Robert J. Hollingsworth et al., Note, The Ohio Small Claims Court: An
Empirical Study, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 469 (1973).
17. See generally 1976 Hearings, supra note 10.
18. The first small claims court in the United States was established in Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1913. See Elwell & Carlson, supra note 1, at 434 n.3.
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claims.19 Cumbersome formal court procedures resulted in unrea-
sonable delay and expense, and made it virtually impossible for liti-
gants to use the court system to collect on small debts without the
use of an attorney.20 The courthouse doors were closed to many
people because of the costs of litigation.2'
Criticisms of the judicial system usually focused on the expense
and delay of litigation.2 z Critics emphasized the undue costs and
fees "arising from widespread appeals and retrials for technical
procedural errors exacerbated by the multiplicity of unified courts
.... ,23 Often, the cost of the suit literally exceeded the amount at
issue.24 In addition, commentators criticized the unduly restricted
role of the magistrate. 25 Due to the magistrate's passive role as a
referee, many felt the magistrate was prevented from acting swiftly
and fairly.26 Critics also faulted the performance of the magistrates
and attorneys.27 Magistrates were accused of being driven by polit-
ical motivation and were chastised for being slow in writing opin-
ions, while lawyers were criticized for encouraging litigation where
matters could easily have been settled out of court.28
Small claims courts were intended to solve these problems by
providing greater access to the court system for the average citi-
zen.29 They were to achieve that goal through simplified proce-
dures, cost reductions, the elimination or discouragement of
attorneys, limitations on appeals, and a grant of procedural discre-
tion to magistrates.30
The initial response to the introduction of small claims courts
was generally favorable and enthusiastic. 31 Over the years, small
claims courts have experienced tremendous growth; 34 states and
the District of Columbia had some type of small claims tribunal by
19. See id. at 434.
20. Id.
21. See generally Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts,
1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 293.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 322.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 324.
26. Steele, supra note 21, at 324.
27. Id. at 325.
28. Id.
29. See Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV.
L. REV. 302, 315 (1913).
30. See id. at 315-19; Steele, supra note 21, at 330-37; Yngvesson & Hennessey,
supra note 5, at 223-24.
31. Elwell & Carlson, supra note 1, at 439.
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1959.32 By the 1960's, the original goals of speed and low cost had
been achieved to some degree, but small claims courts were subject
to intensive study and harsh criticism for their failure to fully
achieve their intended goals.33 Normal court hours were inconve-
nient for the average working person, and lack of knowledge and
experience served as a barrier to access for potential claimants.34
Furthermore, poor litigants in many instances were exploited,
rather than given, an opportunity for redress.3 It was more likely
that a poor litigant would be defending an action rather than bring-
ing one in a small claims court.36 Heavy use by businesses crowded
the docket, and small claims courts were often characterized as col-
lection agencies.37 In contrast, others argued that successful plain-
tiffs were often unable to collect their judgments.38 Close scrutiny
and criticism of small claims courts in the 1960's prompted some
states to institute small claims systems and others to reform their
existing systems.39
Colorado's legislative response may be seen in the context of
that wave of reform. The Colorado statute's legislative declaration
sets forth the rationale and purpose behind the small claims court,
outlining the need for such a court, the types of people meant to
benefit from it, and how the court should work.40 The basic goals
of the small claims court were to encourage use of the court system
by the average lay person and to render that use more efficient and
less expensive.41 The legislature declared that the technical rules of
procedure and evidence should not apply, and that the personnel
implementing and conducting the procedures should be "trained
and equipped to assist anyone with a small claim in a friendly, effi-
cient, and courteous manner .... In short, the small claims
32. Id.'at 439. For a listing of those states and a review of the legislation, see INST.
OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., SMALL CLAIMS COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Supp. 1959).
33. See Kosmin, The Small Claims Court Dilemma, 13 Hous. L. REV. 934, 945
(1976).
34. Id.
35. See Beatrice A. Moulton, Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low
Income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1657, 1662-64 (1969).
36. See id. at 1659-60.
37. See Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 5, at 236.
38. See RUHNKA & WELLER, supra note 4, at 161-69.
39. See id.
40. 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 517 (current version at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-6-401
(1987)).
41. Id.
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-401 (1987).
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court was to be "a court for the people. '43 The drafters anticipated
that, for a small fee, people could resolve their disputes in a trial
lasting about twenty minutes.44
A. Filing Fees
The drafters of the Colorado statute used the figures from a
study by the Colorado Bar Association to determine the fee for
filing a small claim.45 The committee discussed the fee in great de-
tail, attempting to balance the tremendous cost of the new court
system 46 with the interests of users.47 Several committee members
thought that people would be so grateful to have this service avail-
able that they would not mind bearing the entire cost.48 One com-
mittee member stated that "it is an appropriate use of our tax
dollars to provide this service to the people. '4 9 The committee re-
alized that a claim might be so small that a person would not file it
if the cost were ten dollars rather than five.5 ° It was suggested that
an eight dollar fee per plaintiff would not keep anyone out of court
unless they were indigent, in which case the fee could be waived.51
After some discussion, the committee agreed that eight dollars was
the maximum amount that could be charged while still maintaining
the function and purpose of the court.52 An eight dollar fee was
ultimately imposed 53 "for the purpose that we want people to use
the court systems. 54
Since 1976 the fee has been raised several times. In 1990, the
legislature decided that the docket fee for actions filed in the small
claims court should "reflect the range of the monetary jurisdic-
43. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Before the enactment of the Colorado statute, the Colorado Bar Association
researched other states' small claims procedures. In 1976, Harry Lawson, state court
administrator, outlined a cost estimate for the implementation of Senate Bill 52,
based on the studies of other states' small claims courts. Id. (statement of Harry Law-
son, state court administrator). The Colorado study estimated that the total cost of a
small claims court in Colorado for the first nine months would be $101,356. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. For example, one committee member discussed the possibility of someone
bringing suit against a cleaner who ruined a sweater worth only twenty dollars. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 520 (current version at COLO'. REV. STAT. § 13-32-
101(1)(c)(II) (Supp. 1993)). A defendant in an action filed in a small claims court was
to pay a fee of four dollars. Id.
54. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10 (statement of unidentified committee member).
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tional limit established for such actions ....", The legislature ex-
plained that the purpose of varying the fees was to "promote access
to the courts and reflect appropriate contributions from litigants
using the court system based on the money judgment sought in an
action. '56 As a result, the docket fees now vary according to the
money judgment sought. 7
B. Jurisdictional Limit
When the Colorado small claims court statute was enacted in
1976, the drafters spent much time deciding the appropriate maxi-
mum "amount in controversy. 58 Steve Weller of the National
Center for State Courts offered data concerning other small claims
courts.5 9 He explained that despite maximum claims ranging from
$100 in Georgia to $2500 in Florida courts, the highest average
claim of any state was only $303.60 Weller noted that people were
not bringing higher claims even when they were permitted to do
so.
6 1
Using these figures, the legislature decided on a $500 limit in
Colorado,62 the most common limit at that time around the coun-
try.63 Barry Goldstein of the Colorado Bar Association explained
that "[$500] is a good break off point because usually an attorney
can not adequately represent a party for less than this amount of
money," and a $500 limit "will handle the majority of consumer
type actions which could occur. ' 64 The drafters noted that the limit
must continue to keep pace with inflation,65 which it has done fairly
55. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-32-101(l)(c)(II) (Supp. 1993).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 13-32-101(1)(c)(II)(A)-(C). For example, when the money judgment
sought is five hundred dollars or less, a plaintiff shall pay a fee of eight dollars, and a
defendant shall pay a fee of four dollars; when the money judgment sought exceeds
five hundred dollars and is no more than two thousand dollars, a plaintiff shall pay a
fee of sixteen dollars, and a defendant shall pay a fee of eleven dollars; when the
money judgment sought exceeds two thousand dollars and is no more than three
thousand five hundred dollars, a plaintiff shall pay a fee of twenty-five dollars, and a
defendant shall pay a fee of twenty-one dollars. Id.
58. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 10.
59. Id. (statement of Steve Weller, National Center for State Courts).
60. For example, in Washington, D.C., the maximum claim allowed was $750, but
the average claim was less than half that amount at $337. Likewise, although the limit
was $1000 in Iowa, the average claim in that state was only $303.
61. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10.
62. 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 518.
63. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10 (statement of Barry Goldstein, Colorado Bar
Association).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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well. Since 1976, the jurisdictional limit has been raised four
times.66
C. Magistrates67
County court magistrates are Colorado judicial department em-
ployees. They are appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of, the
chief magistrate of the particular judicial district.68 In Denver, the
magistrate is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the pre-
siding magistrate of the county court, and is an employee of the
City and County of Denver.69 Magistrates are subject to dismissal
for cause by the chief magistrate, with no right of appeal. 70 A mag-
istrate may be a full-time or a part-time employee.71 There is no
residency requirement.7 2 Also, a magistrate is not precluded from
private practice.73 All magistrates in small claims courts must be
66. See 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 879; 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 544; 1988 Colo. Sess.
Laws 601; 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 855 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-403
(Supp. 1993)).
In 1990, with Senate Bill 150, the jurisdictional amount was amended with some
controversy. Senator Considine emphasized that an important goal of the bill was to
expand the jurisdiction of small claims courts and county courts in order to "increase
the options for low-cost dispute resolution without having to hire a lawyer." He rec-
ommended effectuating this goal through an increase in the maximum amount in con-
troversy from $2,000 to $10,000. He argued that a $10,000 claim should be allowed in
the small claims court, not because $10,000 is a small claim, but rather because "it is
an option available to a person who is willing to contest that matter without having to
hire a lawyer." During the debates, concerns were expressed that increasing the
amount five-fold would "crowd out the little guy with the little claim" thereby chang-
ing the type of claimants and claims in that court. That concern eventually won out,
as the limit was raised only to $3500.
67. In 1991, the legislature changed the title of court referee to court magistrate
throughout the statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-6-405, 13-6-406, 13-6-409, 13-6-
410 (Supp. 1991). Representative Foster explained that the change was requested by
referees who did not feel the title "referee" actually reflected their level of
responsibility. Committee Hearings on S.B. 144 Before the House Judiciary Committee
(Feb. 21, 1991) (statement of Representative Foster, bill sponsor) (audio tapes on file
at the Colorado State Archives).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-405(1) (Supp. 1991).
69. Since Denver county court is funded by the City and County of Denver, the
hiring of magistrates is governed by the ordinances and charter of the City and
County of Denver. Every other employee in the Colorado judicial system is hired
under the personnel rules of the supreme court as provided by statute since they are
funded by the state.
70. Id.
71. Because the statute does not specify that a magistrate must be a full-time em-
ployee, it is assumed that a magistrate can also work part time. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-6-405 (Supp. 1993).
72. See id.
73. Id.
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licensed attorneys, and they exercise the same powers as judges in
other courts.74
Small claims trials are influenced by the individual practices of
the trial magistrate to a much greater extent than formal trials.
Given the broad grant of discretion,75 the magistrate's attitudes
and opinions play an important role in the procedure. Judge
Horan expressed his concern during the committee debates that,
especially when the case load got heavy, magistrates might become
more concerned with the opinions and philosophies of the presid-
ing magistrate than with the issues at trial.76 He urged that the
magistrates' latitude, which was intended to be broad, was unnec-
essarily limited by a system that required a chief magistrate to su-
pervise the other magistrates and to coordinate the administration
of the courts.77 He recommended that magistrates be appointed
independently.78 Although all agreed that Judge Horan's concern
was valid,79 the existing proposal was not altered.
D. Who Can Sue?
Studies show that one of the major problems of small claims
courts in other states is their use as a collection agency.8 ° The con-
cept of a "people's court" rules out the idea of collection agency
involvement; "only the person with whom the debt is involved may
appear."' 81 Allowing otherwise would "clog the docket" and "dis-
courage claims by individuals. '8 2 Accordingly, the statute bars as-
signees and collection agencies from suing in small claims court.83
According to the legislative history, "the purpose of this provision
is to allow only the real party to a transaction to participate in
processing a claim or defending a claim. '
The statute also sets forth that "no plaintiff may file more than
two claims per month, eighteen claims per year, in the small claims
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-405(3) (Supp. 1993).
75. Id.
76. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 10 (statement of Judge Horan).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (statement of Bob Arnoff, student, University of Denver College of Law).
81. See id. (statement of Barry Goldstein, Colorado Bar Association).
82. Id.
83. 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 517, 519 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-
407(1) (Supp. 1993)).
84. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10 (statement of unidentified committee member).
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court of any county. '85 This provision is intended to "make sure
that no one party or group abuses the use of the court to the detri-
ment of other parties." 6 The one exception to this limitation is the
result of a legislative amendment that allows the filing of thirty
claims per month by governmental agencies seeking recovery for
student loan defaults.87
E. Time of Hearing
Section 13-6-401 states that hearings "should be conducted at
times convenient to the persons using them,,including evening and
Saturday sessions." ' The drafters discussed this provision in the
legislative history, urging that the statute was meant for the benefit
of the people of the State of Colorado, not for the convenience of
the magistrates or clerks.89 All present agreed that magistrates
could, and should, modify their schedules in order to accommodate
working people using the small claims court.90
Despite the clear representations of the legislature that such
hours would be desirable, nowhere in the statute are evening or
weekend sessions mandated. Section 13-6-406 requires only that
the small claims court "conduct hearings at such times as the judge
or magistrate may determine or as the supreme court may order." 91
Barry Goldstein explained that "the purpose [of Section 13-6-406]
is to allow flexibility for scheduling hearings."92 Goldstein empha-
sized that "as set forth in the legislative declaration, this is to be a
people's type court and when necessary, court sessions should be
held in evenings or Saturdays so that these people who have small
claims will not have to be docked from work or take time off in
order to process a claim. 93
85. 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 517, 520 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-
411(1) (Supp. 1993)).
86. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10 (statement of unidentified committee member).
87. 1983 Colo. Sess. Laws 792 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-411
(Supp. 1993)).
88. 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 517 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-401
(1987)).
89. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10.
90. Id.
91. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-406 (1987 & Supp. 1993). Rule 511 of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure does require, however, that "at least one weekend session
and at least one evening session shall be scheduled, or available to be scheduled, for
trials in each small claims court each month." COLO. R. CIv. PRO. 511.
92. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10 (statement of Barry Goldstein, Colorado Bar
Association).
93. Id.
19941
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F. Attorneys
The question of whether an attorney should be involved in a
small claims proceeding sparked some interesting discussion
among the committee members.94 Although lawyers can provide
valuable assistance to litigants unfamiliar with the legal process and
can help to clearly define complex legal issues, the legislature de-
cided that the costs of such assistance outweighed the benefits. 95
As a result, attorneys are not permitted in the Colorado small
claims court unless they are suing or being sued, or acting as a full-
time employee of a partnership or corporation involved in the
case.96 If an attorney appears, then the other party may also have
an attorney.97
The goal behind this rule was to allow the average lay person to
merely tell his or her story, without the burden of objections and
technical rules of procedure and evidence.98 It was thought that
this would encourage immediate dispute resolution and prevent
procedural technicalities from overpowering the interest of achiev-
ing justice. 99 As one drafter suggested, "the no attorney concept is
critical because people are afraid of lawyers."'100 Given the legisla-
ture's objective of encouraging use of the court system, such barri-
ers would clearly be undesirable. 10 1
94. Id.
95. Id. (statement of unidentified committee member).
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-407(2) (Supp. 1993).
97. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-407(3) (Supp. 1991).
98. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The decision to exclude attorneys is consistent with many other states' small
claims procedure. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-512(B)(6) (1990) (lawyer
prohibited from appearing or taking part in small claim); IDAHO CODE § 1-2308 (1990
& Supp. 1993) (attorney may not participate in prosecution or defense of small claims
litigation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2707(a) (1983 & Supp. 1987) (no representation by
an attorney prior to judgment); MICH. ComP. LAWS § 600.8408(1) (1987 & Supp.
1988) (attorney may not take part except on own behalf); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
2803(2) (1989) (no party may be represented by an attorney); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 55.090 (1988) (no attorney may appear except on own behalf). Most commentators
agree that having to consult a lawyer in connection with a small claim is contrary to
the purposes of small claims courts. See generally RUHNKA & WELLER, supra note 4,
at 193-94 (presence of lawyer lengthened trial); Kosmin, supra note 33 ("[O]ne of the
principles behind the small claims court movement was to provide an inexpensive,
speedy forum for resolving disputes where lawyers would not be needed.").
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Ill. The Court's Current Operation
A. Research Design
To begin the study, the researchers gathered empirical data by
reading court files and observing actual small claims court proceed-
ings.' °2 The plan was to develop data on a fairly large number of
cases, while being sensitive to the limitations that the volunteer-
based research design would entail. It was understood at the out-
set that quantitative results would be suggestive only, because a
wide variety of factors made it impossible to establish a truly ran-
dom sample of cases in either the file- or observation-based por-
tions of the research.
The project's file segment consisted of an examination of 160
files drawn at random from a 10,000 file sampling dated from 1987
to 1991.103 From the files, we extracted certain data, including the
nature of the case, the magistrate, the dollar amount in contro-
versy, and, where appropriate, the type of payment. We recorded
the information from each individual file onto a data sheet. Upon
completion of the 160 data sheets, we coded the data and entered it
into a program for computer analysis. The coding process involved
102. There is a long tradition of empirical study of small claims courts. Among the
past significant studies are: Archibald S. Alexander, Small Claims Courts in Montana:
A Statistical Study, 44 MONT. L. REV. 227 (1983); James G. Frierson, Let's Abolish
Small Claims Courts, 16 JUDGES' J. 18 (Fall 1977); Bruce J. Graham & John R. Snor-
turn, Small Claims Court: Where the Little Man Has His Day, 60 JUDICATURE 260
(1977); William G. Haemmel, The North Carolina Small Claims Court-An Empirical
Study, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503 (1973); William L. King II, Measuring the Scales:
An Empirical Look at the Hawaii Small Claims Court, 12 HAW. B.J. 3 (Summer 1976);
Michael H. Minton & Jon E. Steffenson, Small Claims Courts: A Survey and Analysis,
55 JUDICATURE 324 (1972); Robert E. Muir, The Hawaii Small Claims Court: An Em-
pirical Study, 12 HAW. B.J. 19 (Summer 1976); Elizabeth Purdum, Examining the
Claims of Small Claims Court: A Florida Case Study, 65 JUDICATURE 25 (1981); Alvin
Stauber, Small Claims Courts in Florida: An Empirical Study, 54 FLA. B.J. 130 (1980);
John M. Steadman & Richard S. Rosenstein, "Small Claims" Consumer Plaintiffs in
the Philadelphia Municipal Court: An Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1309
(1973); Neil Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and
an Empirical Investigation, 18 LAW & Soc'v REV. 515 (1984); Robert J. Hollings-
worth et al., Note, The Ohio Small Claims Court: An Empirical Study, 42 U. CIN. L.
REV. 469 (1973); Carl R. Pagter et. al, Comment, The California Small Claims Court,
52 CAL. L. REV. 876 (1964).
103. The filing system in the Denver Small Claims Court is primitive. Files on cases
where a judgment has not been paid or where there has been no trial are considered
"active." These are housed within the main division of the Small Claims Court Office
so that the clerks and the public may access them. The files for cases in which there
has been full payment of a judgment, or where no payment was due because of settle-
ment, discharge or a defendant's victory were treated as "satisfied." These files are
stored in a separate storage area. These files are still accessible, but are more difficult
to obtain than those which are active.
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formulating categories for the information contained in the data
sheets.'04
The methodology for the court observation portion of the re-
search was informal. Several researchers-our "court observ-
ers"-watched sixty trials and discussed them with litigants,
following an interview guide. 10 5 The court observers recorded both
their own observations and the replies to the interview questions.
The basis for selecting cases for observation was partly to avoid
concentrating on any single magistrate or any particular time or
day of the week; however, time limitations prevented the achieve-
ment of true randomness. During the data collection phase of the
study, the court observers held approximately ten group meetings
to discuss the cases they had observed and to assist the file analysts
to become familiar with the small claims court process. Two re-
searchers studied the written records of the court observations;
their goal was to identify patterns and illustrative examples of is-
sues that were seen originally in this study or were known to have
been of concern in past small claims court research.
B. Characteristics of Litigants
There was an enormous range of age, race, and socio-economic
status among the litigants who were observed. The study revealed
that middle-aged, middle-income Whites dominated the court-
room. The appearance by indigents in small claims court was de
minimis. Men and women filed claims in equal proportion. Wo-
men sued other women a little more frequently than they sued
men. Men, however, filed claims against other men in overwhelm-
ing proportions to the claims they filed against women. Individuals
filed the majority of the claims, suing other individuals a little more
104. Although the files were selected at random, there were no controls over sea-
sons of the year in which selected cases might have been filed, and there was no effort
to determine whether the selected cases were equivalent in major characteristics to
cases filed at other times. For this reason, the statistics generated from these data are
presented as suggestive and qualitative only, rather than as explicitly representative of
the precise numbers presented.
105. Interviewers used the following standard format:
1. Could you tell me what happened, so I can make sure I have good
notes?
2. How did you hear about Small Claims Court?
3. How did you get ready for court?
4. What did you think of how it went?
5. What did you do with (defendant/plaintiff) before you got to court?
(try to find out whether parties used other means of dispute resolution)
6. What other experiences have you had with small claims court?
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frequently than they sued businesses. The number of claims filed
by businesses against individuals was relatively low compared to
the number of claims filed by businesses against other businesses.
The in-court observations showed that an overwhelming major-
ity of the cases involved Whites filing their claims against other
Whites. No African-American observed had filed a suit against a
White, and only a few suits were filed by Whites against African-
Americans. Asians and Hispanics filed suits against Whites in the
same proportions as Whites filed against them. There were no
suits by Asians against other Asians, and no suits by Asians against
a race other than White. Hispanics filed suit only against other
Hispanics or Whites. Although middle-aged litigants dominated
the courtroom, younger plaintiffs appeared frequently and filed
suit against individuals of various ages in equal numbers. There
were a few cases filed by individuals who appeared to be over the
age of sixty-five.
These impressionistic findings seem to suggest that non-minority
litigants occupy a disproportionate share of the court's re-
sources.10 6 That impression may be false, however, because it does
not reflect any data on the rates with which other demographic
groups encounter problems of the types suitable for treatment in
the court. The in-court observations do show that a diverse popu-
lation of litigants has familiarity with the court, in the roles of
plaintiff and defendant.
The majority of litigants observed were aware of small claims
court prior to involvement in their disputes. They learned of small
claims court through general knowledge, by way of friends and
family who had previously used the forum, or through the media.
A relatively small portion of litigants was unaware of small claims
court prior to involvement in a dispute, and learned about the
court via contacts with other governmental entities, such as the
State Labor Relations Board.
A portion of the litigants had used small claims court before.
This group was diverse. Repeat use is not exclusively accounted
for by business litigants; some members of the general public also
use the forum repeatedly. °7 Most repeat litigants had previous
106. According to the 1990 Census, 61.4% of the population of Denver is white.
107. The study revealed that repeat claimants were generally aware of the statute
restricting use to two claims per month and eleven claims per year. The statute was
not abused by any claim filed in the trials observed as part of this study. Whether the
statute is abused, whether repeat use is administratively monitored, and whether the
restriction is enforced are issues beyond the scope of this study.
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judgments awarded in their favor, and had succeeded in judgment
collection. One repeat litigant interviewed, however, has never
prevailed, and has never been satisfied with the magistrate's ruling.
She continues, however, to use the forum to resolve disputes. °8
The study showed that word-of-mouth information among com-
munities of court users is an important factor in a person's decision
to use the court. Although repeated use of the court is an atypical
pattern, a future study might find value in obtaining information
from the small group of frequent users. The methods in which they
have used the court and found satisfaction with its functioning
might be transferable to other litigants through educational pro-
grams or through the redesign of procedures to emphasize aspects
that have been satisfactory.
C. Results of Trial
1. Plaintiff Victory is the Norm
In a comparison of nine Denver Small Claims Court magistrates,
the least pro-plaintiff magistrate ruled in favor of the plaintiff 80%
of the time, whereas the most pro-plaintiff found for the plaintiff
94% of the time. The overall rate of plaintiff victory for all magis-
trates, in cases where the plaintiff appeared for trial, was 85%.1°9
Among the cases examined, there were a few in which the de-
fendant won. Given the probability of a plaintiff victory, these
cases were anomalous. One such case involved a $500 breach of
contract claim regarding the purchase of a house. The plaintiff had
signed an offer of purchase after another bidder backed out. He
believed that the house would be his, based on representations by
the seller. Therefore, he incurred expenses related to the purchase:
inspection, contracting, and credit report fees. The contract, how-
ever, was never signed by the seller defendant. Until signed by the
seller, the instrument was only an offer. Because there was no con-
tract in this instance, dismissal was appropriate.
A second case involved a claim and a counterclaim, both of
which were dismissed. The plaintiff sought the return of a $600
security deposit balance on retail space. The defendant's attorney
returned $400 to plaintiff with an accompanying letter stating "in
full satisfaction." The plaintiff demanded the additional $200 be-
108. References such as this are from the records of statements made to our court
observers.
109. These statistics are consistent with findings of similar studies of small claims
courts. See, e.g., Elwell & Carlson, supra note 1, at 507; Yngvesson & Hennessey,
supra note 5, at 246.
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cause the space was not ready when needed. The counterclaim was
for one month's rent. The space remained vacant because plaintiff
failed to occupy the premises. The counterclaim was dismissed be-
cause there was no signed lease agreement. The original claim was
dismissed because plaintiff had previously accepted a $400 check
marked "in full satisfaction." Again, there was a legal basis on
which to dismiss this case. However, other facts may have played a
role in this decision. The plaintiff had a strong German accent and
did not present a clear statement of the facts. Her presentation
was vague and disjointed. These factors may have affected the
judgment.
. Another case in which plaintiff's claim was dismissed is worthy
of note. The case involved a claim for unpaid wages. The plaintiff
claimed he was paid less than the amount agreed to in a verbal
contract for payment of a certain hourly wage, but he was unclear
about the dates he had worked. The defendant disputed the
amount owed under the verbal agreement and paid the plaintiff a
lesser amount. The magistrate admonished the plaintiff for being
ill-prepared and for not presenting direct physical evidence. Be-
cause the plaintiff did not prove his case by a preponderance of the
evidence, the claim was dismissed. The magistrate clearly acted
within legal parameters in deciding this issue. However, the plain-
tiff apparently lost this case more because he failed to present a
cohesive, substantiated argument than because of the relative merit
of his position.
A final case that was dismissed involved a realtor and a mort-
gage broker with directly conflicting testimony. The plaintiff of-
fered physical evidence in a cavalier, inconsistent manner, and with
multiple qualifications. The case was dismissed because it was not
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. If the plaintiff had
been more precise and had appeared more sincere in her presenta-
tion, judgment might have been awarded in her favor.
The dismissal of these cases reveals the significance that magis-
trates sometimes place on well-organized, cohesive, and substanti-
ated testimony. In some of these instances, the quality of advocacy
seemingly expected may be beyond the reach of a lay-person.
Nonetheless, these defendant victory cases are significant, because
they are the only indications that a typically pro-plaintiff institution
will sometimes produce results in favor of defendants.
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2. Amount Awarded
The amount of judgment awarded is a product of many different
elements of a small claims court trial, including the magistrate pre-
siding over the case, the nature of the case, and the care given by
the plaintiff to the presentation of the case. Table 1 illustrates the
average amount of judgment awarded, if any, by three magistrates,
without regard to the nature of the case. 110 Table 1 also shows the
average award as a percentage of the claim.
Table 1: Average Percentage of Claim Awarded, by Magistrate*
Magistrate Magistrate Magistrate
One Two Three
Average Amount of
Claim $627.50 $1084.20 $734.16
Average Amount of
Judgment $590.90 $811.74 $612.29
Average Percentage
Amount Demanded 94.17% 74.87% 83.4%
* The figures in this table are drawn from the following number of cases:
Magistrate One - 33; Magistrate Two - 38; Magistrate Three - 10.
a. The Magistrate
The claims in the observed cases ranged from $110 to $3500-
the maximum limit allowed in small claims court."' There is no
minimum limit on the amount for any claim."12 The average judg-
ment for all magistrates was $671.25; however, the awards varied
among magistrates, and the percentages of award granted varied
dramatically. Magistrate One, on the average, awarded $590.90;
110. References to Magistrates "One," "Two," and "Three" refer to particular indi-
vidual magistrates. Because the statistical reports are qualitatively reliable but not
precisely reliable in a quantitative sense, it was thought that identifying the magis-
trates by name would be inappropriate. Where references are made to these magis-
trates in connection with in-court observations, it was again considered proper to
identify them by number rather than name, since the cases observed in the study are
only a small fraction of the cases over which they preside, and because those cases
were not selected at random.
Data were collected on cases heard by a large number of magistrates. For only
three magistrates the number of cases in the sample was large enough to make it
sensible to report percentage results.
111. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-403 (Supp. 1993).
112. The claims are limited in a practical sense, however. Since the cost of filing
claims is eight dollars, and since other costs are imposed on plaintiff's time and re-
sources, it is unlikely that claims under ten dollars will be brought.
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Magistrate Two awarded $811.73; and Magistrate Three awarded
$612.29.
Generally, plaintiffs received over 84% of the amount they re-
quested; therefore in the Denver Small Claims Court, there is a
positive correlation between a high demand and a high award. For
instance, Magistrate One, on the average, awarded over 94% of the
amount demanded; Magistrate Two awarded 75%; Magistrate
Three awarded 83%. These figures indicate that the identity of the
magistrate can greatly influence the judgment, often by as much as
20%. Furthermore, plaintiffs are likely to receive an award be-
tween $550 and $820.
In comparing the dollar amount awarded to the percentage of
the amount demanded, it is apparent that plaintiffs in different
courtrooms, in the cases studied, requested varying monetary
awards. Even though Magistrate Two only awarded 75% of the
amount demanded, his awards were higher than those of the other
magistrates. Therefore, although Magistrates One and Three
awarded lesser dollar amounts, they were more prone to award the
actual amount demanded. A plaintiff can be more confident of re-
ceiving the amount sought with Magistrates One and Three.
b. The Nature of the Case
As illustrated in Table 2, the nature of the case also affects the
amount of the judgment. The cases arising in the Denver Small
Claims Court were distilled into six categories: (1) failure to pay
rent; (2) failure to return security deposit; (3) failure to adequately
perform services; (4) failure to adequately pay for services;113 (5)
failure to adequately compensate for damages; and (6) other. In
cases where the claim was based upon a failure to pay rent, the
average judgment was $370.40. Suits based on failure to return se-
curity deposit had an average judgment of $118.67. In service ori-
ented cases, judgments were almost identical whether cases were
brought for failure to adequately perform or for failure to pay for
services. The average judgment in a failed performance case was
$374.20, while the average judgment in cases dealing with failure to
adequately pay for services was $378.07. Cases addressing a failure
to adequately compensate for damage had an average judgment of
$323.29.
113. Forty-five percent of the observed plaintiffs filed claims for failure to ade-
quately pay for services.
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The amount awarded, as a percentage of the amount demanded,
was usually high. There was just a slight discrepancy between the
different categories of cases. In cases for failure to pay for services,
the plaintiffs received 93.4% of what they demanded from the de-
fendants. However, plaintiffs suing for failure to adequately per-
form services received only 64.7% of the amount that they
demanded. This category represented the lowest return on the
amount demanded. In failure-to-pay-rent and failure-to-return-se-
curity-deposit cases, plaintiffs received 73.4% and 81.5%, of the
amount demanded, respectively. Finally, plaintiffs attempting to
gain compensation for damages received 89% of the amount that
they demanded.
Although the judgment amounts for failure to pay for services
and for failure to perform services were very similar, the plaintiffs
in each of these categories demanded significantly different
amounts. In both categories, plaintiffs received approximately
$370, but this figure represents 93% of the amount demanded in
failure-to-pay cases and 64% in failure-to-perform categories.
Thus, the plaintiffs in failure-to-perform cases typically requested
higher monetary amounts.
Table 2: Average Amount of Judgment, by Type of Claim
Failure
to Failure to Failure to Failure to
Failure Return Adequately Adequately Compensate
Nature of to Pay Security Perform Pay for for
the Case Rent Deposit Service Service Damages Other
Average
Demand $504.60 $145.60 $578.36 $404.78 $363.25
Average
Amoung
of
Judgment $370.40 $118.67 $374.20 $378.06 $323.29 $478.82
Average
Percentage
of
Demand 73.4% 81.5% 64.7% 93.4% 89%
c. The Care of Presentation
The care given to presentation of a case also appears to influence
the magistrate's decision, although in the trials observed, the
amount of a claim did not seem to influence the care in presenta-
tion. One plaintiff brought a $110 claim, suing her former em-
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ployer for back wages on a breach of contract theory. Prior to
suing, she sought assistance from the Colorado State Board of Em-
ployment. At trial, she presented time cards, wage stubs, and a
self-prepared record of events to support her claim. Her presenta-
tion was forthright and organized, even though her claim was mini-
mal. The defendant, a chiropractor, was distant throughout the
proceeding. He brought little evidence, and was less prepared,
haughty, and indifferent. This matter could have gone either way.
The care of presentation appeared to influence the magistrate, who
awarded judgment to plaintiff.
At the opposite end of the spectrum was a plaintiff whose claim
exceeded $3,000. This plaintiff showed no diligence in preparation
for court, although convinced before trial that he would prevail.
The case involved an artist who had a contract to produce 20,000
promotional maps. Because the plaintiff was not satisfied with the
work done on the first project, the defendant offered the plaintiff a
$200 discount on the job and a 20% discount on the next two or-
ders received from the plaintiff. At the end of this first project, the
plaintiff owed the defendant $962.
The plaintiff was completely satisfied with the second job. How-
ever, he alleged that the defendant lost the original art work, which
was needed to produce quarterly updates of the map. As a result
of the loss, plaintiff reproduced the original. He claimed that the
reproduction took him 104 hours at $30 per hour, totalling $3,100.
Defendant claimed that he had not lost the art work, but rather
had held it to induce plaintiff's payment for the first project; had
plaintiff paid the balance, defendant would have delivered the orig-
inal, thereby avoiding the necessity of the reproduction.
The contract clearly granted the defendant a property right in his
art work, pending payment. Because plaintiff had not paid the bal-
ance of $962, defendant was within legal bounds to hold the art
work. The magistrate ruled that the condition precedent to conver-
sion never occurred. Therefore, judgment was granted to defend-
ant. Although this claim was highly detailed and involved a sizable
amount, the plaintiff was poorly organized. He brought no evi-
dence, such as bids, contracts, or dates, to support his claim. He
continually interrupted the magistrate and appeared impatient
throughout the trial. This claim was very important to the plaintiff,
who takes his work very seriously. Had he applied zeal to his case
presentation, judgment might have been granted in his favor.
Many litigants whose claims involved relatively small amounts of
money presented their cases with painstaking accuracy, using pre-
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cise dates and times, and offering a variety of physical evidence.
Others with larger claims often spoke without notes and offered no
physical evidence. There was no pattern in which the amount of a
claim seemed to be related to the litigant's care of presentation.
There was evidence, however, that magistrates responded to care-
fully presented arguments.
D. Comprehension of Verdict and Procedure
Although a substantial majority of litigants said they understood
the magistrate's decision, most of them did not know what to do
immediately upon leaving the courtroom. A common misconcep-
tion is that after judgment is granted, the prevailing party will be
paid immediately. The study revealed one party who paid immedi-
ately post-trial and two parties who prepared payment schedules
together before leaving the courthouse. Two others promised to
have a check waiting later that day. The remainder of the parties
left the courtroom with no plan for collection.
Some of the confusion stems from truncated, confusing instruc-
tions from the magistrates. After a magistrate's ruling, the losing
party is instructed either to pay the judgment before leaving the
courthouse or to complete a set of interrogatories, which is then
provided. Sometimes the magistrate tells the losing party that the
interrogatories must be completed before the party leaves the
courthouse. Other times the magistrate gives the losing party a few
days to complete the forms. No apparent pattern or reason under-
lies this inconsistency. Most of the time, the magistrate tells the
losing party that he or she will be held in contempt of court unless
the interrogatories are completed.
The interrogatories consist of three pages of questions. There
are twenty-six questions to answer. The questions request per-
sonal, employment, and financial information. Included are ques-
tions regarding ownership of property, recording information from
deeds to property, creditors' names, account numbers and bal-
ances, payment of wages, health insurance, other money judg-
ments, state and federal income tax refunds, held securities,
vehicles and livestock or crops owned, and other personalty owned.
The last item is a request for the party's most recent federal income
tax return.
The interrogatories are intimidating and time-consuming to com-
plete. Perhaps for this reason, parties often choose not to complete
the forms. The parties observed often felt frustrated and scared by
the form's questions. Although three or four clerks are generally
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available to assist parties in completing the form if asked, some-
times the parties were too frightened or unwilling to approach the
counter. Usually the parties were not equipped with all of the nec-
essary information to complete the form, such as deed recording
information, prior tax return refund information, and account
numbers.
The intimidating and confusing procedure leads to at least three
possibilities. First, perhaps the parties completing the form will
have no difficulty because many of the questions are inapplicable.
Second, perhaps the complexity of the form will encourage a party
to pay the judgment on the spot to avoid the forms altogether; this
seems unlikely, however, because a party who does not complete
the form is not required to pay on the spot, and because, most of
the time, the parties do not come to court prepared to pay a judg-
ment. Third, perhaps the defendant will not understand the form
and will omit information that would be necessary to collect the
judgment.
If completed, the interrogatories provide useful financial and
employment information to the party who is owed money. At that
point, the long road to judgment collection has just begun.
E. Judgment Collection
Perhaps the single greatest problem associated with small claims
courts involves collection of judgments. 14 The Denver Small
Claims Court is no exception. The collection procedure is typically
confusing, difficult, and disconcerting to litigants. Even the court-
provided information refers to collection as "complicated" and rec-
ommends contacting an attorney. 115 The brochure outlines meth-
ods of collection such as demanding payment, garnishing wages,
and obtaining liens against real estate. Parties are warned against
attempting collection procedures without legal advice unless they
are absolutely sure about what they are doing.
Overall, plaintiffs in this study collected only 31% of the
amounts awarded; 55% of plaintiffs collected no part of their judg-
ments. At a greater level of specificity, the percentage that the
plaintiff actually collects can depend on the magistrate. As illus-
114. See RUHNKA & WELLER, supra note 4, at 161-69 ("The existing process for
using the legal process to enforce small claims judgments is fragmented ... and is too
complex for many litigants to use without the assistance of an attorney.") Id. at 172;
Elwell & Carlson, supra note 1, at 450.
115. All who file a complaint receive the brochure, "How to Use the Colorado
Small Claims Court." It begins by saying "the small claims court is an informal court
that you can use to file lawsuits for up to $3,500, without an attorney."
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trated in Table 3, the percentage collected varied from about 18%
to 39% depending on which magistrate was presiding. For instance
Magistrate Three awarded $612, on the average, but the collection
percentage was only 18%; therefore, the plaintiffs actually received
an average of only $110.16. Magistrate One, however, awarded
$590, and the collection rate was 30%; therefore, plaintiffs received
$177. In essence, the dollar amount awarded appears higher when
the percentage collected is not considered. Although Magistrate
Three consistently awarded a higher dollar amount, the plaintiffs
actually collected less. It is important to note that although there
are clear discrepancies among the different magistrates in the
amount actually collected, the magistrates all have a low overall
rate of collection.
Table 3: Average Percentage of Judgment Collected, by
Magistrate
Magistrate Magistrate Magistrate
One Two Three
Average Percentage of
Judgment Collected 29.70% 38.91% 18.48%
The type of payment also varied among the different magis-
trates. According to the court files, parties in Denver Small Claims
Court actions tender payment in several forms, including no pay-
ment (which includes settlement), full payment, and garnishment.
With all magistrates, between 60% and 63% of the parties made no
payment whatsoever. There were greater discrepancies in the full
payment and garnishment categories. In Magistrate One's court-
room, 6.6% of the parties made a full payment either at the time of
judgment or at some point thereafter. By contrast, in Magistrate
Two's courtroom, 13.5% tendered full payment. None of the par-
ties in Magistrate Three's courtroom made a full payment.
Perhaps the most effective means of collection is through the
garnishment process, in which the court gains direct access to the
defendant's bank account or employment check, so that at sched-
uled intervals, payment may be drawn directly from these accounts.
The garnished wages go directly to the court, which delivers the
payment to the payee. Compared to the other collection methods,
large numbers of plaintiffs receive at least some degree of compen-
sation. Problems arise, however, when a garnishee moves or
changes employment, making the collection process convoluted
and precluding completion of payment. Unfortunately, due to a
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congested docket and lack of resources, the Denver Small Claims
Court does little to correct this problem, and plaintiffs often go
uncompensated.
The use of the garnishment process varies among magistrates.
Thirty-three percent of Magistrate One's cases were dealt with
through garnishment. However, in Magistrate Two's courtroom,
only 23.7% went to garnishment. Magistrate Three, who utilizes
the system the most, sent 40% through the garnishment process.
Because the garnishment process appears to be the most successful
method of redressing plaintiffs' injuries, this type of payment
should be refined and utilized more.
The complexity of the existing apparatus for collection in Denver
forces many small claims judgment creditors to go to an attorney
for assistance in collecting a judgment. These additional costs can
severely undercut the otherwise low cost of winning the judgment.
In response to similar problems, many states have implemented
more unique external collection methods designed to deter judg-
ment debtors from failing to satisfy their debts. For example, in
Kansas, the court may hold the judgment debtor in contempt for
failure to provide financial information requested by the court
upon failure to pay judgment, 116 and in New York, a defendant
with three small claims judgments against him may have to pay
treble damages if the judgment is not paid within thirty days.117 In
Ohio, any party who willfully fails to comply with an order of the
court can be cited for contempt by the small claims court,1 8 and in
Washington, nonpayment of a small claims judgment within twenty
days permits the court to increase judgment by a certain amount.11 9
F. Appeals
In the span of three years ending in 1991, only 126 appeals-
about one percent of the number of cases tried'2 0-were filed with
the Denver County Small Claims Court. This study examined each
of those appeals. The study does not reveal whether the small
number of appeals resulted from inadequate information being
116. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2707(b) (Supp. 1992).
117. N.Y. CIT CIVIL COURT Acr § 1812 (Consol. 1981).
118. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.13 (Page 1983 & Supp. 1992).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.105 (1993).
120. Telephone interview with Kathy Ellerbee, Supervisor, Denver County Court
Civil Records Division (Dec. 21, 1992). Ms. Ellerbee stated that the approximate
annual numbers of small claims court cases and small claims court appeals are approx-
imately 4,500 and 50, respectively. Since 1992, the rate of appeals has gone up to
approximately two percent. Id.
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conveyed to the losing party or whether parties decided that the
appeal process was not worth pursuing.
It is likely that the small number of appeals resulted, at least in
part, from losing parties' general lack of awareness of the right to
appeal. At the end of most trials, the magistrate tells the losing
party that he or she may file an appeal. 121 Magistrates rarely ex-
plain the appeal process, however, and they do not always inform
the losing party that all appeals must be filed within fifteen days of
judgment.12 2 In order to appeal a case in Denver, the dissatisfied
party must post a $70 bond as well as the amount of the judgment,
if any, found against the party.123 This sum may dissuade a losing
party from filing an appeal. The losing party must choose between
paying the cost of an appeal or perhaps not paying at all.
Appeals of small claims judgments are heard by district
judges.2 4 The appeals may be prepared pro se or by an attor-
ney.125 In the cases reviewed for this study, some appeals appeared
to have been technically prepared-they used legal terminology-
while others were handwritten or typed on the party's letterhead
stationery. Once an appeal is filed, the appellee has the option to
respond or allow the transcript to speak for itself. 26
While appeals are rare, so much more so are reversals. Approxi-
mately 92% of small claims court appeals result in affirmance.
Only eight cases in the years studied involved a reversal, remand,
or vacating of a judgment. 27 Because only a minuscule proportion
of cases are appealed, and because there is an overwhelming pat-
tern of affirmance in appealed cases, the magistrates' decisions are
essentially final.
The rarity of reversal suggests that errors less severe may occur
without occasioning appellate scrutiny. For example, in one case,
the losing party claimed that the small claims court referee person-
ally insulted her and the defendant, that he did not listen to the
evidence and consider it in an impartial, unbiased manner, and that
he dismissed her case due to a prejudicial state of mind and due to
121. All provisions of law and rules concerning appeals from the county court apply
to small claims appeals. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-410 (Supp. 1993).
122. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-311 (Supp. 1991).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 13-6-310(1) (1987).
125. Id. § 13-6-410 (Supp. 1993).
126. Id. § 13-6-311(4) (Supp. 1991).
127. In the 34 small claims court appeals of 1989, 31 resulted in affirmance, two in
remand and one was vacated. In the records available from 1990, 33 of 35 appeals
resulted in affirmance, one judgment was remanded and one vacated. The percent-
ages for 1991 were identical to those of 1989, with 91% resulting in affirmance.
SMALL CLAIMS COURT
his personal summation of the low character of the defendant and
due to personal judgments made of the plaintiff. The appellate
court held that the proceedings were improperly conducted. The
court found that despite the relaxed application of the rules associ-
ated with small claims courts and the authority of magistrates to act
quickly and candidly, these proceedings were conducted in an un-
satisfactory manner.
This opinion addresses the great shortcoming of small claims
courts: justice is not only rough, but it may occur outside of any
other corrective structure. Here, had the plaintiff not written to a
chief magistrate, no one in authority would have known that injus-
tice had occurred. While this situation may be likened to appeals
processes in other court systems, the parties in small claims court
rarely have legal advisors to explain the benefits of, and procedures
for, appealing the judgment.
In a few highly unusual cases in which appeals were taken, the
trial court had granted the prevailing plaintiffs more than they had
demanded. One plaintiff claimed $255 and received $1,055; an-
other demanded $1,262 and received $1,728. It is not surprising
that a defendant would appeal adversity of this dimension. How-
ever, due to the requirement of posting the judgment in order to
appeal, the initial judgment was always paid in these cases.
IV. Critique of Current Operation
A. Sources of Delay
In cases studied by in-court observation, factors that might be
thought of as "technicalities" by law-trained individuals seemed to
cause delay and confusion in a number of instances. Many litigants
brought claims to recover personal property or to have action
taken against someone, despite the inability of the court to grant
such relief.128 Two such cases involved plaintiffs who demanded
128. All who file a complaint receive the brochure, "How to Use the Colorado
Small Claims Court." It states that "small claims court may be used for money debts,
personal injury claims, or property damages up to $3,500, or for canceling, avoiding,
or getting out of a contract when the amount involved does not exceed $3,500." The
brochure, however, is unclear. It does not state that the court can only grant money
verdicts.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-403(2) explicitly states that the small claims court shall
have no jurisdiction over the following matters:
(a) Those matters excluded from county court jurisdiction under § 13-6-
105(1);
(b) Actions involving claims of defamation by libel or slander;
(c) Actions of forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer;
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that their landlords return personal property. Another case in-
volved a plaintiff who wanted a garage lessee's belongings removed
from the garage for failure to pay rent. The forum failed these
plaintiffs on all three counts. It was neither speedy nor informal;
the plaintiffs were delayed because of a misunderstanding of the
function of small claims courts, and resolution of their claims re-
quired a lawsuit in a more formal court. Furthermore, it was not
inexpensive; these plaintiffs wasted the cost of the filing fees by
filing claims in a court which could not hear them.
Delay is also caused by uncertainty regarding jurisdiction. One
magistrate was uncertain whether Denver or Adams County had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Because the magistrate
did not want to interfere with Adams County's authority, the mag-
istrate suggested that the plaintiff return to Adams County to de-
termine personal jurisdiction. A properly operating monitoring
system would have discovered this apparently flawed complaint
before time and money were spent by the court and the plaintiff in
preparing the case for trial.
There were also several instances in which the resolution of
plaintiffs' dispute was delayed because the plaintiffs sued the
wrong parties. These cases were dismissed. One such case in-
volved a plaintiff suing a car-repair shop for $2,000 in damages re-
sulting from an improperly installed, rebuilt car engine. The
magistrate ruled that plaintiff had not proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that defendant was at fault. Because the warranty
obligation on the rebuilt engine was the responsibility of the Cali-
fornia corporation that sold the engine to the defendant, the plain-
tiff was left to figure out how to sue a California corporation.
Another case involved a homeowner whose claim was against a
realtor. The plaintiff had purchased a home with an FHA mort-
gage. The FHA inspection required the seller to repair freeze
damage in the house. The sales contract contained a clause requir-
ing that the repair of water damage be completed before closing.
The repairs were delayed, and the plaintiff sought reimbursement
for one month's rent that he incurred as a result of the delay. The
(d) Actions in replevin;
(e) Actions for specific performance;
(f) Actions brought or defended on behalf of a class;
(g) Actions requesting or involving prejudgment remedies;
(h) Actions involving injunctive relief;
(i) Traffic violations and other criminal matters;
(j) Awards of body executions.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-6-403(2) (1987).
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magistrate informed the plaintiff that he was suing the wrong party.
The realtor was only the agent for the seller, and the plaintiff
should have sued the seller.
Multiple cases were placed in suspension because the corporate
defendants filed for bankruptcy after the claim was initiated.
When the plaintiffs appeared in court, they were told that the cases
could not be heard because of the pending bankruptcy actions.
The plaintiffs were not made aware in advance. They appeared in
court ready to try their cases, only to be told to go home.
Another source of delay was the late notice of counterclaims.
One case involved a couple who was not served with a counter-
claim until they arrived at the courthouse for trial. The magistrate
gave them the option of having the case heard that day or postpon-
ing the trial until they had time to prepare their defense to the
counterclaim. They chose to take the additional time to prepare.
Providing some kind of counseling function, or some other
source of paralegal advice, would forestall some of the delay and
confusion seen in this pattern of cases.
B. Costs of Trial
For most litigants, the main cost of participating in small claims
court proceedings is the loss of time, often involving a loss of wages
or other earnings. Some of the observed cases included more ex-
tensive investments by litigants. The potential for extra expense to
a plaintiff is higher when a defendant's conduct is the subject of a
criminal trial. A California plaintiff's case illustrates this problem.
While visiting Denver, the plaintiff observed the defendant beating
a woman. In trying to help, he was beaten too. The city entered
criminal charges of aggravated assault against the defendant. The
plaintiff filed a civil action for his medical expenses and scheduled
his suit to commence after the criminal trial. He then returned to
his home in California. The criminal trial was continued, but no
one communicated this information to the plaintiff. At his ex-
pense, he flew to Denver for the civil trial. At the trial, the magis-
trate asserted the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights not to
testify in a civil action when a criminal matter is pending. The
plaintiff scheduled a second trial, returned home, and flew to Den-
ver again after the criminal matter was resolved. Because the de-
fendant had been found guilty, the plaintiff prevailed in small
claims court. He believes strongly that small claims court empow-
ers individuals to bring their own claims and to not rely on an ex-
pensive legal system. He said he brought the claim not just to save
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money but to have control over what was said at trial. His attempt
to save money was thwarted by an inefficient system that failed to
inform him of the criminal trial's continuance.
C. Judicial Styles
1. Personal Approaches, to Similar Situations
Variation of judicial styles is undoubtedly common from one
courtroom to another, but such variation may be more significant
to litigants in small claims court than in other courts. This is be-
cause a small claims magistrate has a greater role in the outcome of
cases than other presiding officials have. Because litigants are not
represented by lawyers, the system intentionally excludes a pri-
mary mechanism for correcting judicial errors at trial. Also, be-
cause appeals are less likely in small claims court and almost
always lead to affirmance, they are not a realistic control of judicial
conduct. Furthermore, unpredictable conduct among magistrates
may nullify the preparation of the litigants. Litigants often rely on
word of mouth on how to proceed in small claims court. If such a
litigant comes before a magistrate with a markedly different style
than expected, then such advice will not be effective.
The Denver magistrates' judicial styles have been markedly dif-
ferent in similar situations. Magistrate One generally adhered
closely to the rules, often appearing harsh and abrasive. In one
particularly compelling trial, that abrasiveness had an unfortunate
effect on the trial. The plaintiff was a street person who had failed
to pay for rent for two nights in a motel. The motel confiscated her
belongings, which included sheets, a sleeping bag, clothing, and a
radio. She sued to regain her belongings, and the motel counter-
claimed for the rent. The court granted an extension so plaintiff
could answer the counterclaim. After the extension, the plaintiff
appeared with no answer. She reiterated that she wanted her be-
longings back. The magistrate reprimanded her for submitting no
answer. She said that she tried to pay the motel but they claimed
they did not understand English. When she reiterated her plea, the
magistrate told her the court had no.jurisdiction to return her per-
sonal property and only had the power to grant its value. She be-
gan to list her personal items and, with the help of a friend, to
ascertain value. The magistrate hammered questions at her for
which she did not have answers. She did not know how old her
sleeping bag was or the quality of the filling. After a few in-
terchanges, she left the court in tears in the middle of her testi-
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mony. She wanted her things, not their value. Despite two trips to
the court she felt the process was unsuccessful.
The magistrate then heard defendant motel's story. The motel
admitted keeping the items to induce the payment of rent. They
acknowledged that plaintiff had returned, demanding her things
and offering to pay one night's rent. The magistrate found that
defendant was unlawfully withholding plaintiff's property. He en-
tered judgment in favor of plaintiff for the amount of the incom-
plete list to which she had testified, but the plaintiff had left the
courtroom and did not hear this judgment.
By contrast, in the courtroom of Magistrate Two, rules are per-
haps too relaxed. This magistrate allowed parties to interrupt each
other. Parties even interrupted during his rulings. He addressed
the situation of a plaintiff asking for personal property, not money,
differently than Magistrate One's response. Plaintiff, a carpet
layer, sued his employer for back wages and a carpet that he had
negligently installed, for which money had been deducted from his
pay. (Another installer had already removed the carpet and in-
stalled the correct one). The plaintiff claimed that he paid for his
mistake and was entitled to the carpet. The magistrate agreed. He
asked where the carpet was. No one knew. Had the carpet's loca-
tion been known, he would have granted plaintiff's request. Be-
cause it wasn't available, the magistrate awarded its value.
The magistrate was wrong to consider the return of property as a
remedy. The court's jurisdiction is limited, and the statute specifi-
cally excludes replevin from the court's powers. 29 The magis
trate's gentler manner, however, may have allowed the plaintiff to
see the righteousness of his claim.
In situations where evidence is directly contradictory, judicial
styles vary. Magistrate Three dismissed a case because there was
no proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff had
hired a mortgage broker to search for a better financing package
than the one she had. When one was not available, she sought the
return of her money. The broker argued that he was hired to find
her the best deal, and he spent her money on a survey and applica-
tion fee thinking he already had her approval. The parties
presented no other evidence, and the magistrate dismissed the
claim.
Yet, in a case of similar circumstances, the same magistrate con-
tinued a trial. A vehicle hit the plaintiff's car, and its driver then
129. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-403 (Supp. 1993); see supra note 128.
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drove it from the scene of the accident. The plaintiff's brother
heard the crash and recorded the departing car's license number.
The plaintiff called the police and the defendant's car was im-
pounded. The only evidence presented by the plaintiff was that a
detective told him that the paint and damage matched on the two
vehicles. The plaintiff brought no witnesses or physical evidence to
trial. The magistrate continued the trial for thirty days. He in-
structed the plaintiff to subpoena the detective and to provide po-
lice and insurance reports so he would have some basis for a fair
ruling. He refused to rule against the defendant without more
evidence.
These cases are possible to distinguish. In the latter case physi-
cal evidence was available though it was not presented at trial. In
the former case, credibility became an issue because no other evi-
dence was presented. Nonetheless, from an observer's perspective,
both cases seemed to present similarly appropriate circumstances
in which to allow a party additional time to collect evidence that
could be brought to trial.
Magistrate One's style, when oral testimony is contradictory, is
different. In a trial involving wages owed, the plaintiff and defend-
ant presented different stories. Magistrate One found for the
plaintiff. On the record he said, "Testimony is contradictory, there-
fore upon observation of the demeanor of the parties, I must hold
that defendant is the more reliable witness." This is a common re-
sponse for Magistrate One and does not necessarily comport with
the standard of proof required in civil cases. .
Some parties react negatively to a public statement of their unre-
liability. One plaintiff said that she felt the purpose of the court
should be to resolve issues, not to hurl insults at parties. She also
stated that she will not use small claims court again. Such a reac-
tion to judicial conduct is antithetical to the purpose of the court.
Magistrate Four has a courteous manner in trials. Once, when
the defendant slated for the eight o'clock docket had not arrived,
the magistrate allowed him fifteen minutes to appear and went on
to the next case. Furthermore, although it is common for pro se
litigants to present information not pertinent to the trial, Magis-
trate Four was able to interrupt with precise questions that did not
embarrass them, but provided a focus.
2. Varying Applications of Evidentiary Rules
The brochure available from the clerk of the court, entitled How
to Use the Colorado Small Claims Court, instructs litigants to bring
SMALL CLAIMS COURT
receipts, documents, estimates, pictures, or other means of proving
their claims. Although technical rules of evidence do not apply in a
small claims court proceeding,130 this study's court observations re-
vealed that rules of evidence were selectively enforced.
Many parties did not bring evidence, despite instructions in the
brochure. This was a substantial reason why litigants did not pre-
vail. The system, however, allows magistrates some latitude in ren-
dering decisions.
Magistrates exercise a wide variety of what might be called judi-
cial notice. One plaintiff, claiming negligent car repair, brought in
a part that he claimed had not been changed when he paid for a
tune-up on his car. The magistrate ascertained that the part was
sufficiently worn and should have been changed. He allowed
plaintiff the value of having the part changed. Afterward, the
plaintiff admitted his surprise at the magistrate's fact-finding
abilities.
As explained earlier, Magistrate One used the demeanor of the
parties to reach a decision. The case was over a wage dispute, and
neither side had presented sufficient evidence. The magistrate
found that the defendant's demeanor was more believable. On
that basis he dismissed the case. Had the plaintiff been the more
believable party, it is possible that the magistrate would have de-
cided in his favor.
Another plaintiff sought the value of a ring she had left with a
jeweler for repair. The jeweler had lost the ring and had sent the
plaintiff two substitute rings and a note admitting the loss. The
plaintiff did not bring the jeweler's note to court; however, she was
allowed to disclose its contents to the court. The court's leniency in
this case may have been because the defendant did not appear at
trial and the plaintiff was a default winner.
In another trial, the plaintiffs sought the return of their security
deposit. The defendant lessor had withheld the deposit, claiming
that the tenants did not give sufficient notice of terminating the
lease. The defendant also counterclaimed for cleanup costs and
stove replacement. As evidence of the lease, the tenants offered
the contract. The lessor failed to bring receipts to prove the costs
claimed. The magistrate denied the counterclaims based on a lack
of evidence.
130. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-401 (1987) ("Procedures for the inexpensive, speedy,
and informal resolution of small claims in a forum where the rules of substantive law
apply, but the rules of procedure and pleading and the technical rules of evidence do
not apply, are desirable.").
19941
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
In another case the plaintiff had loaned his towing boom to the
defendants, who intended to start a tow truck business. While the
defendants were in possession of the boom, it disappeared. Shortly
thereafter, the defendants spotted the boom being driven on the
road, and they asked that driver for proof of ownership. The driver
produced a bill of sale from another party. The defendants told
police and were informed that only the boom's owner could file a
complaint. Defendants asked the plaintiff to file a complaint, but
the plaintiff sued defendants instead. He sought $1500-the value
of the boom five years ago when it was new. He presented a bill of
sale. The defendants argued that the boom was only worth half of
its original value, but they had no evidence. Judgment was entered
against the defendants for $1500 even though the proof of value
was five years old.
In this relaxed evidentiary atmosphere, the system is without
some of the natural checks that rules of evidence provide in the
advocacy process. The potential for abuse is high, and a danger
exists that a decision may be based on a magistrate's personal feel-
ings instead of on rules of law. A trial exhibiting this tendency in-
volved a suit against a roofing company. The plaintiff hired the
defendant to repair damage caused by a hailstorm. He sued the
company, relating a series of delays and a failed inspection. At
trial, the magistrate began questioning the homeowner about the
amount of insurance reimbursement he had received for the storm
damage. Although no physical evidence was before the court on
these matters, the magistrate based his decision in part on the fact
that the plaintiff had made money as a result of the storm. The
decision reflected the magistrate's personal feelings. The insurance
recovery was raised in the magistrate's decision, based on evidence
not before the court. The issue was arguably irrelevant; however,
the parties were not given an opportunity to respond to the magis-
trate's ruling.
Litigants often attempt to relate statements made by third par-
ties who are not present in court. In these situations Magistrate
Four would raise his hand to stop the talking and say, "You may
bring in that person as a witness, or you may bring in a letter he
wrote you, but unless you use those methods, I cannot listen to
your interpretation of what he said." This contrasts with another
magistrate's response, "I don't want to hear what he said."
In one observed case, the magistrate did not allow a traffic acci-
dent victim to state what a person on the sidewalk had said imme-
diately after the accident about the cause of the accident.
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Colorado's evidence rules would characterize this testimony as
within the hearsay exception for "present sense impression" state-
ments and would allow its admission.' Understandably, the liti-
gant's lack of legal knowledge precluded any discussion of whether
that exception could sensibly be applied.
3. Varying Applications of Procedural Rules
Researchers observed varying applications of the rules of venue
and service of process. For venue to be proper, the party being
sued must, at the time the claim is filed, either live, be regularly
employed, or have a business office in the county where the claim
is filed. 132 One case that was dismissed for improper venue in-
volved a traffic accident in Boulder in which a Boulder resident
caused damaged to a Denver resident's car. It was dismissed be-
cause defendant had no relationship with Denver.
The service-of-process statute provides that defendants shall be
notified of the small claims court action "either by certified mail,
return receipt requested, or by personal service of process, as pro-
vided by the rules of procedure for the small claims court.'
1 33
Plaintiffs often forgot to bring proof of service. When this hap-
pened, the magistrate usually sent the party to obtain a copy. Im-
proper service was grounds for dismissal in one trial where an
improper party was served. In another trial, however, the defend-
ant argued that he had insufficient time to subpoena witnesses, be-
cause he had only recently learned of the trial. His brother, who
does not live with him, had accepted service and neglected to tell
him. Because the defendant had not raised this issue before trial,
the magistrate concluded he had waived an improper service de-
fense. In contrast, one magistrate never made an observed finding
of proper or improper venue or service.
This selective enforcement of statutory requirements seems un-
just, particularly when it takes place in a context that is virtually
immune from appellate scrutiny.
V. Conclusion
The image of the Denver Small Claims Court obtained through
the informal observations and the quantitative records analysis in
this study shows a pattern consistent with other small claims court
131. COLO. R. EvID. 803(1).
132. Colo. R. SMALL CLAIMS COURT 519.
133. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-415 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
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studies: a wide range of user satisfaction, a wide range of judicial
styles, and varied degrees of rigor and accuracy in application of
procedural and substantive law. This process leads to frequent
plaintiff victories, followed up with only slight success by plaintiffs
in judgment collection.
Particularly because appellate review does not seem to be a real-
istic source of quality control, disparate approaches to outcome-
controlling issues pose certain problems. Significant differences
among magistrates were observed in connection with evidence is-
sues, such as the requirement of documentary evidence or the re-
strictions on hearsay. Magistrates also differed in their treatment
of cases where litigants were not adequately prepared, and in their
recourse to the garnishment method of judgment collection.
Differences in judicial style are unavoidable in all court systems,
but where appellate review-the usual control on judicial perform-
ance-is virtually nonexistent, those differences suggest a need for
substitute measures that might increase the proportion of accu-
rately rendered evidentiary and substantive decisions.
The obstacles plaintiffs face in collecting judgments should be
reduced as much as possible. The study reveals that the garnish-
ment process is best suited to producing payment of judgments.
That evidence should reinforce the possible trend towards empha-
sis of the garnishment process by current magistrates. At the very
least, the difficulties associated with collection should be explained
to individuals who are considering whether to use the court as a
medium of redress.
To some extent, the small claims court procedure continues to be
difficult for litigants to understand. The court might provide coun-
selors who could explain the plain meaning of terms used by magis-
trates in rendering judgments. Also, providing some source of
preliminary information about the requirements of various causes
of action and the details of jurisdictional requirements would be
extremely helpful to both plaintiffs and defendants.
This study does not definitively answer the ultimate question re-
lated to a modern urban small claims court-would we miss it if it
were gone? Certainly, many litigants are satisfied with the treat-
ment they receive. The study cannot show how individuals would
react to the elimination of a governmental resource that is fairly
well known and may be perceived as an avenue to just resolution
of disputes. It is safe to assume that the court's positive factors
would be strengthened with additional resources, such as better
support for magistrates, provision of counselors to explain and fa-
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cilitate the court's workings, and a more effective role for appellate
review in the overall system.
Without considering the context of competing demands for gov-
ernmental funds, it seems clear to the authors that allocating such
additional resources would provide genuine benefits to small
claims users, and that improving the effectiveness of small claims
courts ought to be treated as a significant priority. The symbolic
promise offered by an element of the justice system such as a small
claims court should be matched by the reality of its performance.
The Denver Small Claims Court, as is true for most courts of its
type, shows some significant discrepancies between the promise
and the reality. Closing that gap would serve litigants well and
would benefit society in general by increasing in some small mea-
sure the match between governmental goals and governmental
performance.

